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THE SCIENTER ELEMENT IN CALIFORNIA'S
OBSCENITY LAWS: IS THERE A
WAY TO KNOW?t
The door barring federal and state intrusion into [freedom of ex-
pression] cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and
opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroach-
ment upon more important interests.1
The difficulty of having a door which is both "tightly closed"
and "opened . . . the slightest crack" symbolizes the confusion and
complexities in the area of obscenity laws. This note will analyze
some aspects of this confusion by focusing on the scienter element in
obscenity laws, and will emphasize in particular the California scienter
requirement.
Most penal liability is predicated on the legal maxim that actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea-the act alone does -not amount to
guilt; it must be accompanied by a guilty mind or "mens rea." One
form of mens rea is embodied in the Latin word "scienter" which
means "knowingly." A statute which defines a crime as "knowingly"
doing a particular act requires the prosecution to prove the mens rea
of scienter in order to obtain a conviction. A statute which allows
a person to be convicted of a crime without any proof of a guilty mind
imposes what is known as strict liability.
In Smith v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that
an obscenity law which imposes strict liability is unconstitutional. In
Mishkin v: New York,' the Court upheld an obscenity statute because
it was construed to contain "the vital element of scienter" which was
defined as "being aware of the character" of the material. California's
t Ed. note: Prior to the date of actual publication of this issue the United
States Supreme Court rendered a landmark obscenity decision in Miller v. California,
93 S. CL 2607 (1973). The authors of this note believe the Miller decision in no
way resolves the essential problem to which this note addresses itself. However the
body of this note has been "updated" to reflect the changes which the Miller decision
requires in the obscenity area. Furthermore the authors have added a postscript to
the note which explains, analyzes and criticizes the Miller decision in light of the cen-
tral argument of this note.
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (Brennan, J.), quoted in
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
2. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
3. 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966).
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principal obscenity statutes4 also require the prosecution to prove
that a person was "aware of the character" of the material.
The central contention of this note is that California's legislative
and judicial interpretation of the scienter requirement is unconstitu-
tional. Furthermore, it is contended that the only scienter require-
ment which is constitutionally sound is one that requires the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant knew or had reason to know the ma-
terial was legally obscene. These contentions are based on the follow-
ing considerations: first, as applied, the California test of scienter ap-
pears to differ from the "awareness of character" test which the
United States Supreme Court affirmed in Mishkin, although the statu-
tory language is identical to the Mishkin formula; second, the prosecu-
tion apparently can satisfy the current California scienter requirement
simply by proving that a defendant knew that the material in ques-
tion contained sexual matter; third, a statute which in effect defines
scienter as simply "knowledge of sexual content" poses an unreason-
able threat to material which is constitutionally protected; fourth, it was
because strict liability poses an unreasonable threat to constitutionally
4. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1972) provides: "'Obscene matter'
means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person,
applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a whole goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social
importance.
(1) The predominant appeal to prurient interest of the matter is judged with
reference to average adults unless it appears from the nature of the matter or the cir-
cumstances of its dissemination, distribution or exhibition, that it is designed for
clearly defined deviant sexual groups, in which case the predominant appeal of the
matter shall be judged with reference to its intended recipient group.
(2) In prosecutions under this chapter, where circumstances of production, pres-
entation, sale, dissemination, distribution, or publicity indicate that matter is being
commercially exploited by the defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal, such
evidence is probative with respect to the nature of the matter and can justify the con-
clusion that the matter is utterly without redeeming social importance."
Id. § 311(e) provides: "'Knowingly' means being aware of the character of the
matter or live conduct."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2 (West 1970) provides: "(a) Every person who know-
ingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for
sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints, with intent
to distribute or to exhibit to others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits
to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) The provisions of this section with respect to the exhibition of, or the pos-
session with the intent to exhibit, any obscene matter shall not apply to a motion pic-
ture operator or projectionist who is employed by a person licensed by any city or
county and who is acting within the scope of his employment, provided that such op-
erator or projectionist has no financial interest in the place wherein he is so employed."
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protected material that the Supreme Court held that strict liability in ob-
scenity laws is unconstitutional; finally, only if the prosecution is re-
quired to prove that the defendant "reasonably knew the material was
legally obscene" will the element of scienter prevent an unreasonable
threat to constitutionally protected material.
The above analysis leads to an ultimate and crucial inquiry.
Can one ever reasonably know that something is legally obscene? A re-
view of Supreme Court rulings, a statistical analysis of obscenity prose-
cutions in San Francisco, and interviews with lawyers who frequently
deal with the current obscenity laws, indicate that it often may be diffi-
cult to determine what is legally obscene. This note will conclude by
suggesting a method by which this problem may be resolved.
Background
This section provides a general overview of the laws governing ob-
scenity in California so that a sufficient framework can be established
for the central thesis of the note. Three basic questions will be
considered: How do courts define legal obscenity? Can one vio-
late an obscenity law when the material in question is not clearly ob-
scene but there is evidence that he exploited the sexual content of the
material? Can one ever lawfully possess obscene matter?5
Obscenity Defined by the Supreme Court
In Roth v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press."'7 In Roth the Court embarked upon an extended effort
to define obscenity. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held
that the proper test in judging obscenity is "whether to the aver-
5. The following sources are in-depth studies of their respective subjects.
(a) What is obscene: Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Lockhart & McClure]; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUPREME
Cr. REV. 7 [hereinafter cited as Magrath]; Reiss, The Supreme Court and Obscenity:
Mishkin and Ginzburg-Expansion of Freedom of Expression and Improved Regulation
Through Flexible Standards of Obscenity, 21 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 43 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Reiss]; Rogers, Police Control of Obscene Literature, 57 J. Clum. L.C. & P.S.
430 (1966); Silber, The Supreme Court and Obscenity: The Ginzburg Test-Restriction
of First Amendment Freedoms Through Loss of Predictability, 21 RUTGERs L. REV.
56 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Silber]; Wilson, California's New Obscenity Statute: The
Meaning of "Obscene" and the Problem of Scienter, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 513 (1963).
(b) Pandering: Magrath, supra, at 25-37; Reiss, supra, at 53-55; Silber, supra.
(c) Private Possession: Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969
SupREME CT. REV. 203.
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. Id. at 485.
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age person, applying contemporary community standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient inter-
est."8 The Court's holding incorporated a portion of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code which interpreted prurient interest as
"a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion [which] goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or rep-
resentation of such matters."9  The Court clearly stated that obscen-
ity and the portrayal of sex are not synonymous. Rather, obscenity is
that "which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient inter-
est." I 0
In explaining why obscenity was not afforded First Amendment
protection, the Court foreshadowed what was to become another vari-
able in determining what is legally obscene:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance . . . have . . .full protection . . . unless excludable be-
cause they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im-
portance."
Seven years later in Jacobellis v. Ohio,1 2 Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Goldberg, wrote a plurality opinion which expanded on the
concept of "redeeming social importance":
We. . .reiterate. . . our recognition in Roth that obscenity is ex-
cluded from the constitutional protection only because it is "ut-
terly without redeeming social importance" and that "the por-
trayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not it-
self sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press." It follows that material dealing
with sex in a manner that advocates ideas or that has literary or
scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance,
may not be branded obscenity and denied . . .constitutional pro-
tection."
The Court again emphasized that "a work cannot be proscribed unless
it is 'utterly' without social importance,"'1 4 but did not identify just
what type of material would be deemed to be utterly lacking in valid
social content.
In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Plea-
8. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
10. 354 U.S. at 487.
11. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
12. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
13. Id. at 191 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
14. Id; accord, Zeitlin v. Arneberg, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 918, 383 P.2d 152, 164,
31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 812 (1963).
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sure" v. Attorney General,15 the Court refined the test for determining
obscenity, and held that:
[Three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive be-
cause it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value.16
Unless all three elements of the test are met the material in question can-
not be judged obscene.17
In Miller v. California,1 8 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, de-
parted from the Memoirs test. The Court held that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.19
The Miller case thus changes the Memoirs test in two respects. First,
it requires a state obscenity law to "specifically define" the types of sex-
ual depictions which the state wishes to proscribe. Second, it de-
clares that material need no longer be "utterly without redeeming
social value" in order to be found obscene. The court now holds
that a work which "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value" may be found obscene even though it is not "utterly without
redeeming social value."20
Miller is the last Supreme Court decision attempting to define
obscenity. Despite the Court's efforts, disagreement is likely to con-
tinue over the meaning of terms and concepts such as "prurient inter-
est," "community standards," and "lack of serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value."
California's present definition of obscenity is codified in Penal
Code section 311(a)21 which incorporates virtually verbatim the defi-
nitions offered by Roth and Memoirs." It is anticipated that the Cali-
15. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Memoirs v. Massachusetts].
16. Id. at 418.
17. Id. at 418-19.
18. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
19. Id. at 2615 (citations omitted).
20. For further discussion and analysis of the Miller decision see the "Post-
script" to this note, infra.
21. CAL. PEN. CODE. § 3 11(a) (West Supp. 1972), quoted at note 4 supra.
22. It should be noted that the California Supreme Court has held that the
"contemporary standards" referred to in section 311(a) are the contemporary stand-
ards of the state of California. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 577-80, 446 P.2d 535,
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fornia legislature will soon revise Penal Code section 31 (a) to comport
with the Miller ruling.
The Pandering of Sexually Oriented Material May Lead to a Conviction
The Supreme Court added a new dimension to the obscenity issue
in Ginzburg v. United States.23  Ralph Ginzburg was convicted un-
der New York's obscenity statutes for publishing a magazine called
"Eros," which he argued was not obscene. The Court, after not-
ing that Ginzburg had engaged in suggestive promotional schemes
such as attempting to distribute the magazine from Blue Balls and
Intercourse, Pennsylvania, said:
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation
through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination that the material is ob-
scene even though in other contexts the material would escape
such condemnation.2 4
The Court concluded that there is "no threat to First Amendment guar-
antees in . . .holding that in close cases evidence of pandering may
be probative with respect to the nature of the material in question and
thus satisfy the Roth test."25  Apparently, by deliberately portraying
material in a manner designed to arouse prurient interest, a person
can transform constitutionally protected material into obscene ma-
terial. Thus, a person who "panders" material which is marginally ob-
scene may, in a close case, tip the balance towards finding the material
obscene and thereby subject himself to a criminal conviction.26
Mere Private Possession: An Exception Carved Out
In Stanley v. Georgia,27 the Supreme Court ruled that the states
could not prohibit the mere private possession of obscene matter.
545-47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 665, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1968). Giannini includes
a discussion of reasons supporting a statewide standard. In Miller v. California,
93 S. Ct. 2607, 2618-20 (1973), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a statewide standard, as opposed to a national standard, because the
application of a national standard could be "an exercise in futility." Id. For further
discussion of the applicable community standard see the "post-script" to this note, infra.
23. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
24. Id. at 475-76.
25. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
26. The act of representing nonobscene matter as obscene may also be an of-
fense in itself. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.5 (West 1970) which provides: "Every
person who writes, creates, or solicits the publication or distribution of advertising or
other promotional material, or who in any manner promotes, the sale, distribution, or
exhibition of matter represented or held out by him to be obscene, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor."
27. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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Stanley had been convicted under a Georgia obscenity statute after
the police, armed with a search warrant, entered his home to look
for illegal drugs and discovered instead several allegedly obscene
films. The Court held that although the states have a valid interest
in regulating obscenity, such regulation must not conflict with the Con-
stitution.2 Georgia contended, in part, that it had a right to protect
the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity, but the Court re-
jected the state's argument and responded that it "may be a noble pur-
pose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment."29
Georgia also contended that it was necessary to prosecute persons
for possession of allegedly obscene matter in order to enforce the state
law prohibiting distribution of such material. The argument rested
on the assertion that it would be hard to prove an individual intended
to distribute allegedly obscene material if he were legally entitled to
possess it. Again, the Court was unpersuaded and stated that even
if difficulties existed in proving the intent to distribute, that would
not "justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe
what he pleases. '30  The Court further emphasized that since the
right of freedom of expression "is so fundamental to our scheme of in-
dividual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to
ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws. '31
Many legal commentators argued that Stanley marked a major re-
versal in the Court's position on obscenity.32 This impression appar-
28. Id. at 563.
29. Id. at 566. The Court was equally unimpressed with Georgia's contention
that obscenity frequently leads to sexual deviance. It took judicial notice of the fact
that there is "little empirical basis for that assertion." Id.
30. Id. at 567-68.
31. Id. at 568.
32. E.g., Katz, supra note 5, at 208; Note, Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment: The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity. Stanley v. Georgia (U.S. 1969),
57 CALIF. L. REV. 1257, 1275-79 (1969); Note, Stanley v. Georgia: A First Amendment
Approach to Obscenity Control, 31 OHio ST. L.J. 364, 368-70 (1970); Note, Obscenity
from Stanley to Karalexis: A Back Door Approach to First Amendment Protection,
23 VANE. L. REv. 369, 386-87 (1970). See, People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 3d 84, 96 n.5,
480 P.2d 633, 642 n.5, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833, 842 n.5 (1971) (Tobriner, J., dissenting,
quoting Hayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F. Supp. 642, 644 (D. Ore., 1970), vacated,
403 U.S. 927 (1971): "'It is no longer accurate to state categorically that the First
Amendment does not protect obscenity. It is now necessary to inquire beyond the
mere nature of the published matter, and to look into the government's interest in
suppressing it."' Tobriner also wrote: "Thus, as I read Stanley, the governmental
authority to regulate the public distribution of reading material intended for the private
use of adults extends only to measures reasonably related to the protection of juve-
niles or to the protection of the privacy of individuals from unsolicited assaults on
their sensibilities." 4 Cal. 3d at 104, 480 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 848. But
see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973), in which the Supreme
May 1973] 1309
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ently resulted from what was perceived to be a partial retreat from
the Court's holding in Roth. There the Court unequivocally had said,
without exception, that obscenity was not protected by the First Amend-
ment. Then, in Stanley, the Court held that the private possession of
obscene material was constitutionally protected, thus giving some ob-
servers the impression that there might be other contexts in which ob-
scenity would be afforded constitutional protection.
In United States v. Reidel,13 however, the Court stated in effect
that the right to possess obscene matter for private use does not imply
a right to distribute obscene matter to those who wish to possess it
for private use. The Court emphatically declared that "Stanley did
not overrule Roth and we decline to do so now."34
The Requirement of Scienter
United States Supreme Court Rulings
As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court's attempts to define ob-
scenity have produced considerable uncertainty over what is meant by
"prurient interest," "community standards," and "redeeming social
value." However, perhaps the most nebulous problem in the area of
obscenity legislation is the requirement of scienter 5
In Smith v. California,36 the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion of the proprietor of a bookstore who was convicted under a
Los Angeles ordinance which made it unlawful "for any person to have
in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, [or] book...
[i]n any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or kept for
sale."'37  The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because it
lacked a scienter requirement:
[O]ur holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to re-
Court, by a 5-4 vote, rejected the contention that state obscenity laws should not apply
to "consenting adults." The majority felt that state interests concerning the regulation
of obscenity might legitimately and constitutionally extend beyond merely protecting
minors and unconsenting adults.
33. 402U.S. 351 (1971).
34. Id. at 356. The California Supreme Court ruled in In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d
816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966) that Penal Code section 311.2 does not
apply to mere possession of obscene material without an intent to distribute. In light
of Stanley and Klor, it appears unlikely that a California statute prohibiting mere
private possession would be sustained.
35. For a general treatment of the issue of scienter in obscenity laws see Lock-
hart & McClure, supra note 5, at 103-08; Wilson, supra note 5; Note, The Scienter
Requirement In Criminal Obscenity Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 791, 803-20
(1966); Note, Obscenity, 1969: Another Attempt to Define Scienter, 1 PAC. L.J. 364
(1970); Note, Legislation-Obscene Literature, 18 VAND. L. REV. 2084 (1965).
36. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
37. Id. at 148.
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strict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and we
think this ordinance's strict liability feature would tend seriously
to have that effect. .... 88
Significantly, the Court did not specify what form of "mens rea" or
scienter was constitutionally required.
Since the Smith decision, only one other Supreme Court case has
considered the problem of scienter in the area of obscenity legislation.
In Mishkin v. New York,39 the Court affirmed the conviction of a book
publisher under a New York obscenity statute which ostensibly con-
tained no scienter requirement. Although the statute appeared to im-
pose strict liability, the Court noted that the New York Court of Ap-
peals had interpreted the statute to require the "vital element of scien-
ter." 40  The Court quoted the New York court's interpretation which
held that:
A reading of the statute as a whole clearly indicates that
only those who are in some manner aware of the character of the
material they attempt to distribute should be punished.41
The Court concluded that this construction foreclosed a challenge to
the statute based on Smith v. California.4  Again, however, the
Court felt that it was "unnecessary . . . to define . . . 'what sort of
mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecu-
tion.' -3
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that an obscenity conviction
cannot be sustained without some proof of scienter, but proof that a
defendant was "aware of the character" of the allegedly obscene mat-
ter is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. However, the Court has not
38. Id. at 152.
39. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
40. Id. at 510.
41. Id. quoting People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 344-45, 174 N.E.2d 470,
471, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1961) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 510-11.
43. Id. quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
One other Supreme Court case should be noted. In Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967), the Court overturned several obscenity convictions simply by hold-
ing that the material in question was not obscene when measured by the tests enun-
ciated in Roth and Memoirs. Justices Harlan and Clark joined in a dissenting opinion
because the cases "were taken to consider the standards governing the application of
the scienter requirement announced in Smith v. California . . . for obscenity prosecu-
tions. There it was held that a defendant criminally charged with purveying obscene
material must be shown to have had some kind of knowledge of the character of such
material; the quality of that was not defined ...
. . . Today, the Court rules that the materials could not constitutionally be ad-
judged obscene by the States, thus rendering adjudication of the other issues unneces-
sary. In short the Court... refuses to pass on the questions that brought the cases
here." Id. at 771-72 (emphasis added).
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explained clearly what it means by "aware of the character" of the mat-
ter, and likewise has remained silent on any other clarification of what
a constitutional scienter requirement should include.
California Cases and Statutes
California Penal Code section 311.2 provides, inter alia, that it
is unlawful to "knowingly" sell, distribute, or exhibit obscene mate-
rial.44 Prior to 1969, Penal Code section 311(e) defined "knowingly"
as "having knowledge that the matter was obscene." 5  In 1969, the
California legislature amended portions of the obscenity laws and re-
defined "knowingly" to mean "being aware of the character of the
matter."46
Although the pre-1969 definition arguably required the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant knew that the material was legally
obscene, the California courts gave the statute a more restrictive in-
terpretation. In People v. Campise,4 7 the Appellate Department of the
Superior Court of San Diego County stated:
A reasonable construction of Penal Code 311, subsection (e) is as
follows: The defendant must have known the contents of the ma-
terial, and must have in some manner been aware of its obscene
character.
In short, it is not necessary to construe "knowledge that the
matter is obscene" as meaning "knowledge that a court would
decide the matter to be obscene. 48
In People v. Pinkus,49 the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County added:
To construe the code language to mean that an accused must
know that the matter will actually be held constitutionally obscene
... is not a workable standard. Such a construction of Penal
Code section 311, subdivision (e) would altogether stultify ob-
scenity prosecutions.5"
44. See note 4 supra.
45. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2147, § 1, at 4427.
46. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(e) (West Supp. 1972).
47. 242 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 905, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966),
overruled on other grounds by Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 992 n.12,
429 P.2d 192, 199 n.12, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872, 879 n.1 (1967).
48. 242 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 915, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (emphasis added).
49. 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967),
habeas corpus granted sub nom. Pinkus v. Pitchess, 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.), af 'd
sub nom. California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S. 922 (1970). In this case the motion picture
showed a nude woman, alone, simulating self-induced sexual satisfaction. The writ
was granted on the ground that the motion picture was not obscene.
50. Id. 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 949, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86 citing Redrup v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771-72 (1967) (Harlan & Clark, J.J., dissenting); Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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From these rulings, under the pre-1969 definition a defendant could be
found guilty of distributing, selling, or exhibiting obscenity only if in
some manner he knew the "obscene character" of the material.
However, he could not defend on the ground that he did not know the
material was legally obscene.51 The 1969 revision of Penal Code sec-
tion 311(e) deleted the word "obscene" character and substituted
simply "aware[ness] of the character of the matter."52
Since the 1969 amendment few California cases dealing with the
scienter requirement in obscenity legislation have been reported. To
date neither the California Supreme Court nor a state court of appeal has
interpreted the statute as presently worded.53
In People v. Andrews,54 decided in 1972, the Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County reversed an obscenity
conviction holding that: "A state may not prohibit as a crime the dis-
semination of obscene material without requiring a showing of the de-
fendant's knowledge of the character . . . of the matter. ' 55  The court
ruled that merely proving that the defendant owned the establish-
ment from which obscene photographs with text were distributed was
insufficient to establish that he was aware of the character of the ma-
terial.50
In People v. Adler,57 another 1972 decision, the Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County sustained a convic-
tion for distributing obscene matter under Penal Code section 311.2. 51
The court stated that "awareness of the character" of the material could
51. See People v. Pinkus, 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); People v. Campise, 242 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 905, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
52. See notes 45 & 46 supra.
53. One reason for the dearth of reported cases on this subject is that the highest
court in California which can hear an appeal from a municipal court is the Appellate
Department of the Superior Court. CAL. CONST. art. VI § 10, 11; CAL. CODE CIV.
PRoc. § 77 (West Supp. 1971); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1471 (West 1970); CL. RULES OF
COURT 62, 107. The only remaining direct appeal is to the United States Supreme
Court. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148 n.2 (1959). Thus, the usual Cal-
ifornia appellate courts-the courts of appeal and the supreme court-are bypassed
since obscenity violations are misdemeanors unless subsequent to a prior obscenity con-
viction. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.9 (West 1970).
54. 23 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
55. Id. at 8, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 280, citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959).
56. Id.
57. 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972),
petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 19, 1972).
58. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2 (West 1970). For a full text of the statute, see
note 4 supra.
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be proven by circumstantial evidence. 59 The defendants admitted
that they were the owners and proprietors of an "adult" bookstore
and that they dealt with books which were exclusively or primarily
concerned with sex. However, they denied having ever read the partic-
ular book involved, and they further claimed that they neither knew nor
had reason to believe that the particular book in question was ob-
scene.6" Nevertheless, the court felt that there was sufficient proof of
scienter to support a conviction, apparently because the defendants
were aware that the book contained sexual matter.
The Drawbacks in the Requirement of Scienter
Mishkin Has Not Foreclosed an Attack on the Constitutionality of the Cali-
fornia Scienter Requirement
California's statutory definition of scienter requires the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant was "aware of the character" of the
material. Although this language conforms to the scienter require-
ment which the Supreme Court upheld in Mishkin, the California stan-
dard as construed and applied does not seem to conform to the test
of constitutionality described in Mishkin. Under the current Califor-
nia scienter test, it is arguable that a defendant may be convicted where
the prosecution proves no more than that the defendant knew the ma-
terial in question contained sexual matter. This conclusion is predi-
cated on the following reasoning.
First, under the pre-1969 code, knowledge meant "awareness of
the obscene character of the material." As indicated, although the
California courts ruled that this did not mean the defendant must know
that the material was legally obscene, the defendant was required in
some manner to be aware of the obscene character of the material
involved. Then, in 1969, the California legislature deleted all men-
tion of obscenity in defining scienter. In light of the restrictive pre-
1969 California court rulings, this deletion may imply a legislative
attempt to remove from the prosecution any burden of proving that the
defendant knew that the material was obscene.
Second, Webster's dictionary defines "character" as "a feature
used to separate distinguishable things . . . into categories." 61 Since
the California legislature has deleted the word "obscene" from section
311(e), the only feature which might distinguish obscene material
from nonobscene material is the predominantly sexual orientation of
59. 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 37, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726, 734 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1972), citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 154 (1959).
60. Id.
61. WEBsTm's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 140 (7th ed. 1967) (emphasis
added).
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the material. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that a defendant has
scienter that is sufficient to sustain a conviction if he was aware that
the material contained sexual matter.
62
Hence, it is submitted that California's scienter requirement, in pur-
pose and as applied, quite probably is contrary to the Supreme Court's
actual holding in Mishkin. There the Court upheld the "awareness of
character" language but quoted the New York Court of Appeals con-
struction which stated: "It is not innocent but calculated purveyance
of filth which is exorcised . *.". . Thus, although the Court held
that "awareness of the character" forecloses a challenge based on
Smith, the Court adopted that language in the context of a statute which
was interpreted as prohibiting only the "calculated purveyance of
filth."'4
Seemingly California does not require the prosecution to prove
that the defendant was engaged in the "calculated purveyance of
filth," but rather requires only that the prosecution prove that the
defendant knew the material contained sexual matter. Thus Mishkin
does not foreclose a challenge to the constitutionality of California's
obscenity laws. In fact, such a challenge seems impelled by the same
policy considerations which led the Court to declare strict liability un-
constitutional in Smith v. California.
A Statute Which Effectively Limits Scienter to Awareness of Sexual Con-
tent Is Unconstitutional
It has been suggested that the prosecution can satisfy the Califor-
nia scienter requirement simply by proving that the defendant knew
that the material in question contained sexual matter. A central con-
tention of this note is that such a scienter requirement is unconstitu-
tional. This contention is predicated on the reasoning which the
Supreme Court used in finding strict liability unconstitutional in Smith
v. California:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents
of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose
a severe limitation on the public's access to constitutionally pro-
tected matter. For if the bookseller is criminally liable without
knowledge of the contents . . . he will tend to restrict the books
he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have im-
62. This conclusion is further substantiated by the ruling in People v. Adler, 25
Cal. App. 3d 24, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1972). The defendants admitted that they
knew the material in question was sexually explicit. However they denied that they
knew or had any reason to know that the material was obscene. Nevertheless, their
convictions were affirmed. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
63. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966), citing People v. Finklestein,
9 N.Y.2d 342, 344-45, 174 N.E.2d 470, 471 (1961) (emphasis added by Court).
64. Id.
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posed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally pro-
tected as well as obscene literature.65
Implicit in the Court's reasoning is that the bookseller would restrict his
stock to the books he had inspected so that he could determine for him-
self what is obscene. Having made this determination, he could re-
move those books which he concluded were obscene and thereby be
reasonably certain that he could avoid prosecution.
The Court noted that any obscenity statute "will induce some tend-
ency to self-censorship" but that strict liability has "such a tendency" to
produce self-censorship that it violates the First Amendment. 6 Since
obscenity is not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, self-
censorship is necessary if one determines that the matter is obscene.
However, the Court rejected strict liability because it causes one to dis-
seminate only those materials he has inspected and thus forces one to
engage in excessive and unnecessary self-censorship in order to avoid
criminal liability.
California's scienter requirement suffers from the same con-
stitutional infirmity as strict liability in that it also forces excessive
and unnecessary self-censorship. If, as suggested above, one is subject
to criminal liability in California if he knows that the material which he
sells or distributes contains sexual matter,67 he is likely not to sell or
distribute all those materials which have sexual content. However,
the Court acknowledged in Roth that sex and obscenity are not synony-
mous; 68 thus curtailment of sexually oriented material would frequently
lead to excessive and unnecessary self-censorship which would deprive
the public of material which is constitutionally protected.
Nevertheless, under the previously discussed interpretations of
California's current scienter requirement, the only way a person
with certainty can avoid an obscenity conviction is by removing
all the materials which have sexual content. Seemingly, therefore,
California's present scienter requirement has "such a tendency" to pro-
duce excessive and unnecessary self-censorship that Penal Code sec-
tion 311.2 should be declared unconstitutional.
Will Proof of "Awareness of Character" of the Material Ever Obviate an Im-
permissible Degree of Self-Censorship?
The Supreme Court in Smith felt that a proper scienter require-
ment would eliminate the impermissible degree of self-censorship
which strict liability produces. It is submitted that this contention is
65. 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 154-55.
67. See People v. Adler, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1972).
68. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
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valid only if sci~nter is interpreted to mean that the prosecution must
prove the defendant knew the material was legally obscene. This
conclusion rests on the following analysis.
When the Court in Mishkin affirmed the "awareness of charac-
ter" definition of scienter, it apparently assumed that this definition
would obviate an impermissible degree of self-censorship. Pre-
sumably the Court's assumption rested on the premise that the average
individual knows obscenity when he sees it. If this premise were cor-
rect, proof that the defendant was aware of the character of the ma-
terial would justify conviction because (1) if the defendant was aware
of the character of the material and (2) the material later was found
legally obscene, then (3) it would be reasonable to assume that the de-
fendant knew it was legally obscene, and therefore (4) that the defend-
ant was engaged in the calculated purveyance of obscenity.
The crucial inquiry then is whether it is reasonable to assume
that a person will know legal obscenity when he sees it. If one reason-
ably can know that something appeals to prurient interest, is beyond
the community standards of candor, and lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value (i.e., is utterly without redeeming social
values), then an impermissible degree of self-censorship will not result
if the prosecution is required to prove only that a defendant was
"aware of the character" of the material. But if a person often has
no way of reasonably knowing what is legally obscene, this definition
of scienter is grossly inefficient because a person simply will elimi-
nate those materials which are offensive to him. This again produces
unreasonable self-censorship since one's opinion of what is obscene or
offensive may encompass much that is constitutionally protected, while
at the same time failing to exclude matter which might be adjudged le-
gally obscene.
Research suggests that it is unreasonable to assume that a per-
son can know that material is obscene simply because he is aware of
the character of the material. There are three bases for this conclu-
sion.
First, persons repeatedly have been arrested, tried and convicted
under California's obscenity statutes and similar statutes in other states,
only to have the United States Supreme Court overturn the convictions
because, in the opinion of the Court, the films or other allegedly ob-
scene material were not in fact obscene. In at least thirty-six cases
the Court has rendered per curiam decisions reversing convictions under
state obscenity laws."9 Thus what many judges and juries regard as
obviously obscene is, in fact, not legally obscene.
69. Weiner v. California, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Harstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S.
988 (1971); Burgin v. South Carolina, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); Bloss v. Michigan,
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Second, a number of attorneys contacted in the City and County of
San Francisco, California, feel that they cannot advise their clients with
any degree of certainty as to the legal obscenity of material which
graphically depicts sexual activity.70  This indicates that even those per-
sons with extensive legal training and experience with obscenity laws
feel hamstrung by the gaping uncertainties which permeate the subject.
Finally, a person cannot determine what is legally obscene by
reference to the pattern of enforcement of obscenity laws. There
are approximately twenty-five movie theaters exclusively showing
"adult" films in San Francisco. 71 Many bookstores deal exclusively in
"adult" material or have sections of the store limited to "adult" ma-
terial. Most of the films and books which these theaters and book-
stores offer contain material showing or explicitly describing sexual
intercourse, group-sex, lesbianism, homosexuality, oral-genital copu-
lation, masturbation and ejaculation.72 Virtually all of these estab-
lishments have operated continuously for at least two years.
402 U.S. 938 (1971); Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971); California v. Pinkus,
400 U.S. 922 (1970); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v. Ohio,
398 U.S. 434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky,
397 U.S. 319 (1970); Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969); Henry v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert-
Arthur Mgmt. Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v.
Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Maga-
zine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond,
389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Schack-
man v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth
Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388
U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York,
388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California,
388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New
York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967); Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Austin v. Ken-
tucky, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Tralins v.
Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
70. Five San Francisco attorneys, infra note 77, who have handled more than
ten obscenity cases each, were asked the following questions: Q. Are you able, with
reasonable certainty, to recognize matter that is legally obscene when you see it?
A. No. Q. Can you, with any certainty, advise clients who want to sell or distribute
sexual matter, as to the probable legality of the material in question? A. No.
Apparently the same difficulty does not exist with regard to defamation. The
same lawyers were asked: Q. Can you, with reasonable certainty, advise a client
as to whether material which he wishes to publish will subject him to liability in
defamation? A. Yes.
71. Estimated from daily film advertisements in the San Francisco Chronicle,
Mar. 1973.
72. The descriptions of the contents of these books and films were obtained
from reading all search warrants issued for movie theaters and bookstores in the City
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San Francisco Police Department records reveal that from January
1969 to August 1972, 630 arrests were made for alleged violations of
Penal Code section 311.213 which prohibits the sale or distribution of
obscene material. A compilation of the San Francisco Municipal
Court criminal records reveals that 643 counts of section 311.2 were
filed from January 1969 to July 1, 1972.74 However, of these 643
counts, 410 (or approximately 64 percent) were dismissed.7 5  Only
four jury convictions (approximately :V2 percent) were returned.
During this same period seventy-eight guilty pleas were recorded,7 6
but this figure requires an explanation. Interviews with San Fran-
cisco attorneys77 who frequently undertake obscenity defense work sug-
gest that many of the persons who plead guilty to charges under section
311.2 are only marginally connected with the establishments from
which the allegedly obscene materials is disseminated. The police of-
ten will arrest nearly everyone" who is employed on the premises, for
example, ticket takers, popcorn sellers and janitors, against whom
multiple counts are then filed. Then the district attorney's office will
and County of San Francisco from 1969 to 1972. In applying for the search warrant
each police officer meticulously described the materials he had seen at the theaters and
bookstores in question.
73. Bureau of Criminal Information, Statistical Division, San Fran., Cal., Police
Dept., Sept. 29, 1972.
74. 134-40 Index & Docket, San Fran., Cal., Mun. Ct. Records (Jan. 1, 1969-
June 30, 1972). A breakdown by years of statistics:
Search Warrants for 311.2 311.2
Movies and Printed Arrests Prosecutions
Matter/Total of (Police Entered (no. Total
All Warrants Records) of counts) Dismissals Convictions
1969 19/32 35 88 49 27
1970 46/126 147 163 119 15
1971 127/306 326 285 179 37
1972 74/300 122 107 63 4
(to Aug. 1, 1972) (7 mos) (to July 1, (to July 1,
1972) 1972)
TOTALS 266/764 630 643 410 83
Trial
Jail Guilty Trial by Jury Skip to Super.
Sentence Plea Judge Trial Bail Court Pending / Unknown
1969 0 27 0 0 1 0 0 11
1970 1 11 0 4 6 1 0 22
1971 6 36 1 0 7 7 3 52
1972 0 4 0 0 0 2 22 16
TOTALS 7 78 1 4 14 10 25 101
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Interviews with attorneys Ephraim Margolin, George T. Davis, Michael
Kennedy, Joseph Rhine, and Carole Hughes in San Francisco, Feb.-March, 1973.
78. Presumably this does not include motion picture operators and projectionists
who are expressly exempted from arrest. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2(b) (West
1970).
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offer to drop all remaining counts if one person will plead guilty to
one count. Usually the penalty offered is a small fine and a suspended
jail sentence. 79 The defense attorneys interviewed often conclude that
because of the great expense of going to trial and the fact that multiple
counts against other clients will be dropped if the plea bargain is ac-
cepted, it is in the best interest of the majority of the clients jointly
charged to encourage some of them to accept the bargain and plead
guilty.
The foregoing explanation was unrefuted by the district attorney's
office. Although the staff responsible for obscenity prosecutions offi-
cially had "no comment," they specifically refused to state that this
analysis was erroneous.80
Furthermore, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, it seems
unlikely that the district attorney's office would offer a plea bargain if
it thought it had an "air-tight" case. This suggests that even the prose-
cutorial arm of the government may not always be certain of what is
likely to constitute legal obscenity. In light of these facts, it is submitted
that the seventy-eight guilty pleas do not indicate that the defend-
ants involved in many of these cases actually knew or believed the ma-
terial in question was obscene.
Thus, in three years, less than 1 percent of the arrests under sec-
tion 311.2 have resulted in a clear determination by a jury that the
material in question was legally obscene. Such a relationship between
the number of arrests and the number of convictions cannot give the
disseminator of sexually oriented material any idea of what is in fact
legally obscene, i.e., what would be adjudged obscene.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the quandary in
which a prospective entrepreneur might find himself. A movie thea-
ter operator moves to San Francisco in 1973, desiring to establish a
theater which will show "adult" movies and "art" films. He wants
to engage in this type of business because he believes that it is finan-
cially lucrative. But he has no desire to violate California's obscenity
laws.
First, he reads sections 311 and 311.2 but he cannot determine
whether the films he wishes to show violate the standards of section
311(a). Next, he goes to several attorneys for advice on the legality
of the films he wishes to show, but they cannot tell him with certainty
whether the films are in probable violation of the law. Finally, the
79. Those pleading guilty usually were given a sixty day suspended sentence,
one year probation, and a $150 or $250 fine. See 134-40 Index & Docket, San Fran.,
Cal., Records (Jan. 1, 1969-June 30, 1972).
80. Interviews with Martin E. Harband & Jerome Benson, assistant district at-
torneys, San Fran., Cal., on Jan. 15, 1973.
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entrepreneur looks around to see what the other "adult" theaters
are showing. He hears that many of the personnel of these establish-
ments have been arrested, but he also learns that there have been prac-
tically no jury convictions. He thus has no idea of what the particu-
lar community considers to be aimed at prurient interest, beyond
community standards of candor, and lacking in serious literary, artis-
tic, political or scientific value (i.e., utterly without redeeming social
value).
Faced with this situation, the entrepreneur has two probable
choices. He can show all of his films and risk criminal liability, or he
can "play it safe" by censoring all those films which contain sexual
matter. Since he does not want to violate the obscenity laws, the first
choice is unrealistic. But the alternative is likely to result in the censor-
ship of constitutionally protected material. Nevertheless, this quan-
dary is a very real possibility under the current California obscenity
laws.
The facts and the hypothetical presented in this section suggest that
it is unreasonable to assume that one will know legally obscene material
when he sees it. If judges, juries, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
the police are often uncertain or in error as to the obscenity vel non of
a particular film or book, it is certainly unreasonable to infer such
knowledge from proof of the fact that a defendant was "aware of the
character" of material which subsequently was found to be obscene.
In light of the foregoing, the courts should hold unconstitutional a stat-
ute such as California's which defines scienter as "awareness of the
character of the material."
An Alternative: Defining Scienter As "Knowing Or Having Reason To
Know That The Material Is Legally Obscene"
The previous section suggests that defining scienter as "aware-
ness of the character of the material" still poses an unreasonable threat
to constitutionally protected material. If a scienter requirement ever
will obviate unreasonable self-censorship it is mandatory that scienter
be defined as knowing or having reason to know that the material is
legally obscene.81 Arguably, such a test might place a difficult burden
on the prosecution because it would require the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had such knowledge. However, this
burden could be minimized by requiring a "pre-arrest trial, ' 2 a pro-
81. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 5(a), at 106-08.
82. See Massachusetts procedure in MAss. GEN. LAws Ch. 272 § 28C (1970).
For treatment of the analogous area of adversary proceedings prior to the seizure or
censoring of allegedly obscene material, see A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
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cedure by which the police, after proving probable cause before a
magistrate, could obtain a search warrant authorizing them to seize the
allegedly obscene material. However, no arrests would be made at the
time the material is seized. Legal notice would then be published in-
forming the public of a civil trial date at which the question of the
legal obscenity of the material would be adjudicated. If the material
was found to be obscene, that finding would be published in the press
and a compiled and updated list would be kept on file as a matter of
public record. Any person subsequently selling or distributing any of
the proscribed films or printed matter on the list would be subject
to arrest, and, should the matter go to trial, the prosecution could rely
on the list in proving scienter. 83
Several problems are foreseeable under this proposal of course.
First, certain types of material, such as low budget films, have a rapid
production-turnover rate. To require a complete trial of every new
book or film before one could be arrested for selling or distributing it
would prove immensely time-consuming and expensive for both the
prosecution and the disseminators. In fact, such a procedure might
force disseminators to either quit defending the materials or risk fi-
nancial ruin. Second, general rulings, e.g., banning all depictions of
copulation, almost certainly would be overbroad and therefore uncon-
stitutional. Finally, community standards are constantly changing8" so
that a determination in 1973 that a particular movie or book was ob-
scene might not be probative in 1974.
Although redefining scienter as "knowing or having reason to
know that the material is legally obscene" may place a difficult burden
on the prosecution,"5 it must be emphasized that the Supreme Court has
held that freedom of expression "is so fundamental to our scheme of
individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease
see generally Hirsch & Ryan, I Know It When I Seize It: Selected Problems in Ob-
scenity, 4 LOYOLA L. Rnv. (Los Angeles) 9, 23-65 (1971); but see Monica Theater v.
Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 80 (1970).
83. For direct support of this approach see Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607,
2624-25 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 165-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This problem may be further compounded by the fact that community standards of
what is obscene might vary from community to community. Thus, material which is
judged obscene in Orange County might not be obscene if tried in San Francisco.
In People v. Hubsch, No. H-431 (San Fran., Cal., Mun. Ct., Oct. 30, 1973), John
Weston, an attorney who has worked on 600 obscenity cases, testified as an expert
witness that there was no uniform application of the test of penal code section 311.2
in California counties. In fact, Weston testified that in San Diego County the city
attorneys sometimes took opposite positions from the district attorneys on the same
allegedly obscene material.
85. See People v. Pinkus, 256 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1967) and text accompanying note 49 supra.
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the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.""" Although a
stricter definition of scienter will not clarify what is or is not ob-
scene, the proposed scienter requirement will make it less likely that
persons will be convicted of a crime they could not be certain they
were committing. More significantly, the proposed scienter require-
ment correspondingly would reduce the impermissible amount of self-
censorship produced by the present "awareness of character" stand-
ard.
Conclusion
In Smith v. California the Supreme Court contended that a scienter
requirement could eliminate the threat which obscenity legislation poses
to constitutionally protected material. This note has attempted to
demonstrate that California's current scienter requirement does not
adequately remove the threat which California's obscenity laws pose to
constitutionally protected material, and that therefore California's ob-
scenity laws should be declared unconstitutional. In light of this con-
clusion, and considering the fact that First Amendment rights are at
stake, it is urged that the courts re-evaluato the state interests involved
in regulating sexually explicit material, and balance them with the re-
strictions and drawbacks which obscenity laws such as California's con-
tain. Unless courts or legislatures are able to define obscenity in
terms that enable a person to "know it when he sees it," scienter should
be defined as "knowing or having reason to know that the material is
legally obscene."
Postcript
Miller v. California: There's Still No Way to Know
In June 1973, the United States Supreme Court rendered a land-
mark decision in the area of obscenity. Miller v. California,8T decided by
a 5-4 majority, sets forth a new definition of obscenity in an effort to
clarify one of the murkiest issues in constitutional law. This postscript
will briefly highlight the key points in the case and then point out why
the case does not obviate the need for a stricter definition of scienter.
Defendant Miller was convicted of violating California Penal Code
section 311.2(a)88 which prohibits the mailing of obscene material.
On appeal to the appellate division of the superior court, his conviction
was affirmed. Miller then appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of
its ruling.89
86. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) & text accompanying note
31 supra.
87. 93 S. CL 2607 (1973).
88. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1972), quoted at note 4 supra.
89. Miller v. California, 93 S. CL 2607 (1973).
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The Miller decision contains three significant points. First, it
eliminates the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of Mem-
oirs9" and substitutes "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'" Second, it holds
that community standards can be constitutionally interpreted to mean
the standard of the forum state, and need not be interpreted as the
community standards of the nation as a whole.92 Third, the Court
states that "no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or expo-
sure of obscene material unless these materials depict or describe pa-
tently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law, as written or construed. ' 93 The Court, while em-
phasizing that it is not its "function to propose regulatory schemes
for the States"94 gives two examples of what it has in mind by this third
point: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ul-
timate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Pa-
tently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excre-
tory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals."9
The ruling in the Miller case in no way eliminates the constitu-
tional need of defining scienter as "knowing or having reason to know
that the materials are legally obscene."9 6 Since businessmen and others
who engage in the sale of books or movies are not necessarily experts
in the areas of literature, art, politics or science, there is no reason to be-
lieve that they will be better able to identify materials lacking serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value, than to identify materials
which are utterly without redeeming social value.
Nor does the Court's acceptance of California's state-wide commu-
nity standard, as opposed to national community standard, ease the en-
trepreneur's ability to recognize obscene material. A theater owner
who has continuously lived and worked in San Francisco would not
necessarily know what is patently offensive to the citizens of Los An-
geles, Modesto, San Diego, Suisun City, etc. The assertion that there
is in fact a single state-wide community standard is as dubious a legal
90. Id. at 2615. Compare Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)
discussed at text accompanying note 15 supra.
91. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
92. Id. at 2618-20. In so ruling the court formally ended a debate which
emerged in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Compare id. at 192-94 (Brennan,
J., and Goldberg, J.) with id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., and Clark, J., dissenting). How-
ever, while the majority in Miller approved a state-wide standard, it did not expressly
rule on the question of a purely local, i.e. city-wide, community standard. Miller v.
California, 93 S. Ct. at 2618-20.
93. Id. at 2615 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See text accompanying notes 60-86 supra.
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fiction as the assertion of a single national community standard. Nev-
ertheless, the Court's ruling forces a businessman to either recognize
that his materials are patently offensive to the citizens of the State of
California or risk a criminal conviction. To avoid such an undesirable
choice many businessmen and others will undoubtedly engage in ex-
cessive self-censorship thereby jeopardizing the dissemination of and
access to constitutionally protected material. 97
The Court's requirement that the states "specifically define" the
type of sexual conduct which may be found obscene98 also fails to
resolve the problem of excessive self-censorship. In this regard the
Court's own examples prove instructive. The Court first suggests that
the phrase "patently offensive representations or descriptions of ul-
timate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" 99 would be
a sufficiently specific definition to satisfy the requirement. But, one
will ask, what is a "patently offensive" representation? What is an
"ultimate sexual act"? These same types of questions arise concern-
ing the Court's second example, to wit, "patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals."' 0  If a disseminator of materials contain-
ing sexually explicit matter does not know what is "patently of-
fensive" or what is "lewd" he will be forced to ban all materials con-
taining any sexual matter in order to avoid with certainty a criminal
conviction. But only sexual matter which appeals to prurient in-
terest, and is beyond the community standards of candor and lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value is beyond the
protection of the First Amendment. Thus the Court's "specific
definition" rule will not eliminate excessive self-censorship.
If the three key points in the Miller decision are individually in-
adequate to assure scienter sufficient to relieve excessive self-censor-
ship, the three taken together will not prove any more helpful. Thus
it is apparent that nonobscene material will retain the degree of protec-
tion which the First Amendment is designed to ensure only if the prose-
cution is required to prove that a defendant "knew or had reason to
know that the materials in question were legally obscene."'
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